This paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of an increase in the number of firms. If marginal search costs increase with the number of searches, then the demand curve facing any firm will be kinked, with the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases being less than with respect to price increases; prices may not change in response to changes in marginal costs. As the number of firms increases, the maximum price that is consistent with equilibrium increases, to the monopoly price, but the minimum price decreases. On the other hand, if marginal search costs decrease with the number of searches, equilibrium, if it exists, is characterized by a price distribution.
Though it has long been recognized that imperfect information would make markets act less competitively (Scitovsky 1950; Salop 1976) , modern search theory has raised serious questions concerning the robustness of even the qualitative result that increasing the number of firms should lead to lower prices. Although the nature of' market equilibrium with a finite number of firms has not been extensively studied, the case in which there is an infinite number of firms has been. If individuals search sequentially and there are finite search costs (no matter how small), then the market equilibrium is the monopoly price. Two other striking results have been obtained: (1) If there are a finite number of firms, the equilibrium price is below the monopoly price: duopoly appears to be more competitive than atomistic competition. The reason for this is that, in the atomistic models that have been studied, if a firm lowers its price, it will not induce search, whereas in a duopoly, it will. Thus the perceived price elasticity with duopoly is greater than in atomistic competition. As the number of firms increases, the cost of finding a low-price store increases. Hence, the amount of induced search is reduced. Increasing the number of firms seems to have an anticompetitive effect.
As the number of firms increases, however, there are two effects: if' a firm lowers its price, only those with relatively low search costs will find it worthwhile to search since it is harder to find this "bargain."
But while a smaller percentage of individuals at any store are induced to search, there are more stores from which customers can be attracted. When search costs are constant and there is search with replacement,4 the second effect is shown to dominate the first: The conventional result that increasing the number of firms increases the effective degree of competitiveness in the market is reestablished. In the limit, as the number of stores increases to infinity, the price decreases monotonically from the monopoly price to a price that is lower by an amount that depends on f(O), provided only thatf(O) > 0. 5 Thus the standard characterization of the equilibrium with a continuum of firms as entailing the monopoly price is not correct if f(O) > 0.
Standard expositions, while focusing on the first effect, have failed to note the importance of the second effect. Thus, as the number of firms increases, the store that lowers its price recruits very few customers from each of a very large number of stores. It is not correct simply to assume that the number recruited from any one store goes to zero faster than the number of stores increases.
Standard expositions have made a second, important error: they have failed to note the asymmetry of information that is created in these markets the moment an individual arrives at a store. He knows the price at that store; he knows only the distribution of prices at other stores. This asymmetry of information has an important consequence: the elasticity of demand with respect to price increases may differ markedly from the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases. Demand curves in general will be kinked. This in turn has two consequences: (1) If there are a finite number of firms, marginal search costs are constant, and search is conducted without replacement, then the only equilibria entail price distributions; this result holds more generally with decreasing marginal search costs. This result generalizes the analysis of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , who employed the limiting case of a convex search technology in which all searches after the first wei-e, in effect, free. (2) If there are increasing marginal search costs, there may be an indeterminacy of equilibria, and output may not change when marginal costs change.
There are two reasons why it is important to investigate models that generate price distributions. First, there is considerable evidence that product markets are frequently characterized by essentially identical commodities being sold at markedly different prices,6 and a model of 4 Search without replacement means that if an individual samples a store and rejects it, he will not return to it. 5In the limiting case in which f(O) = 0, there is a critical number of firms, N, below which there is no single price equilibrium (see Arrow and Rothschild 1973) . 6 Those who believe in the law of the single price may claim that the products sold at the product market should at least admit this as a possible outcome.7 Second, I noted earlier that, under plausible conditions, if the first search is costly, there exists no equilibrium in the market. This seeming paradox is resolved if there is at least some probability that the price charged is below the monopoly price. Thus the models we have constructed have an internal consistency that was lacking from the models of product markets in which all consumers have strictly positive search costs and there is a continuum of firms.8 This paper is divided into four sections. The model is presented in Section I, while Section II presents the results for a finite number of firms and linear search cost technology. Section III shows how the analysis is altered with a nonlinear search cost technology. Section IV considers the robustness of the results.
I. The Model
Let us consider a market in which, for simplicity, all individuals have identical demand functions for the given commodity, x = x(p), but they differ in their search costs. The individual's indirect utility function can be written as
where Y is the individual's income. Thus, by Roy's formula,
Individuals have a simple search rule: purchase if, on the tth search, p C 1t; do not if p > 't. The term 1t is the reservation price for the tth search. It is the price such that the utility an individual obtains from purchasing at the store he is at presently is equal to the expected different prices differ in some important way, e.g., location, service, etc. This may be true in some instances, but in other instances the magnitude of the price differences is sufficiently large to suggest that these "quality" differences cannot fully account for the observed price differences. In those cases in which these quality differences are important, the appropriate model for analyzing the market is a differentiated commodity market with search costs; such markets will, in general, be characterized by price distributions in the natural sense that, even if the technologies with which the goods are produced are identical, they will sell for different prices. 8 Formally, we can avoid these nonexistence difficulties in the standard way by assuming that the first search is free (see Sec. I). But this is clearly an unsatisfactory assumption. If we assume that the first search costs the same as subsequent searches, our analysis will essentially be unaffected provided the average equilibrium price is low enough; i.e., f(O) is high enough. (Otherwise, we would again encounter problems of' existence.) utility he obtains from continuing search. How the expected utility from continuing search is calculated depends on the nature of the search process, for example, whether search is with or without replacement.)
Assume that in this market there are L individuals and N firms.'0 All individuals know the probability distribution of prices, but not which store charges which price."' Customers randomly search among firms. Each individual continues to search until he finds a store that charges a price at or below his reservation price.
Denote 
Individuals differ in their search costs. In the case of linear search technology, we can represent this by the distribution function F(s).
We can represent the revenue of the firm by
where M is the number of customers who purchase; M is a function of the price charged by the given firm as well as prices charged by other firms. The marginal cost of the product is c. Thus the profit-maximizing 9 In either case, under the assumption of constant search costs, if it pays the individual to continue searching when he samples a price p today, it pays him to continue searching if he subsequently samples the same price at another store. 1() Throughout the analysis, the number of firms will be exogenously determined. But it is easy to allow the endogenous determination of N, as in Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , with U-shaped average cost curves for firms.
l This is a standard assumption in this literature. Though there are some circumstances in which it may have some validity, its main justification is that it greatly simplifies the analysis. firm sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, or
where E is the elasticity of the demand curve facing the firm:
where E is the elasticity of the individual demand curves,
Note that, for a monopolist, d In Mld In p = 0, SO E = E(p*). We can denote the monopoly price by pm:
When M, the number of customers, is not a differentiable function of p, we denote by e+ and e-the elasticity with respect to price increases and decreases. If E+(p*) > E-(p*), as in figure 1, the demand curve has a kink at p = p*, and prices will not, as a result, respond to changes in marginal costs as long as C < *< C 12 Which is more plausible depends on the memory of searchers and on whether firms are pursuing mixed strategies. This will be discussed later. 
A. Search without Replacement
Consider a market with N firms, all charging a price p = p*. In equilibrium, each sells to LIN customers. One firm contemplates raising its price to p > p*. Its low-search-cost customers will leave. Customers know for certain that on the next search they will find a lowprice store. Hence, all those with search costs less than sg leave, where sg is defined by
Equation (8) 
The store that raises its price thus finds that it sells only to with equality holding only for N = 2. Thus, if there are more than two firms, there is a kink in the demand curve, with the elasticity of demand for price decreases exceeding that for price increases. This immediately implies that for N > 2 there cannot be a single price equilibrium (see fig. 2 ).
B. Search with Replacement
The analysis is identical to that given before except now, if a single firm raises its price, it will take an individual who happens to arrive at the high-price store, on average, N/(N -1) searches to find a lowprice store. However, if a single firm lowers its price, it will take N searches, on average, for an individual who first arrives at a highprice store (one charging p*) to find the low-price store. Modifying equation ( 15 There are, as usual, two interpretations to equilibrium price distributions. One entails mixed strategies, while in the other, some stores are always high-price stores, others low-price stores. The former has the advantage that the hypothesis that individuals know the price distribution but not which store charges which price is more plausible than in the latter. The appropriate search model in that case entails search with replacement if the period of search and the period during which prices at a store are fixed coincide. do so. The property that the number of customers is unaffected by small price changes is essential to the result that the only equilibrium entails a single price.
D. Continuum of Firms
When there is a continuum of firms, all prices charged must yield the same profit; each firm is sufficiently small that it believes it will have no effect on search behavior, and hence if, at some price, profits exceeded those at other prices, all firms would switch their price to the one that generates the higher level of profits. Any particular price distribution will generate a particular search behavior (reservation prices for individuals with different search costs); this will determine the sales at each price and, hence, the profitability at each price. The question is, Does there exist a nondegenerate price distribution such that profits are the same at each level of prices charged? In Appendix B, I show that there may be; I derive the differential equation that the price distribution must satisfy and present an example. I also show that the maximum price of the distribution is below the monopoly price.
III. More General Search Technologies
The results obtained in Section II, though striking, are somewhat special. They depend on the special nature of the search technology. It was assumed that, though individuals differed in their search costs, the costs of making each search were independent of the number of searches. This assumption is crucial but implausible. On the one hand, many of the costs of search are fixed: once one has arrived at a shopping center, the marginal costs of going to an additional store may be relatively small. On the other hand, beyond some point, there are increasing costs associated with search: time and money become increasingly scarce. While the former effect makes it more likely that there will not be a single price equilibrium, the latter effect may lead to a kinked demand curve of the form of figure 1 and to the price increasing with the number of firms in the market. When there are many firms in the market, there is a considerable chance that it may take a number of searches to find the low-price store; thus the expected cost of finding the low-price firm may increase faster than N. This will lower the price elasticity for price decreases, giving rise to a kink. And the larger the number of firms, the less elastic the demand curve, thus giving rise to the possibility that prices increase with the number of firms.
Rather than establishing these results in general, we will derive them for the two limiting cases noted earlier.
A. Convex Search Costs
Assume that at most two searches are feasible: S= 0, s2 s, st = oo for t > 2. Now it makes a difference whether a customer who has sampled a store and left can return without incurring a search cost. For simplicity, assume not.
Search without Replacement
The value of E+ is unchanged, but now an individual at a high-price store will set out to find the low-price store if and only if It is the absence of the extensive margin that results in the monopoly price being the market equilibrium price with strictly positive search costs and a continuum of firms. The general case, which is depicted in this paper, is the one in which there is an extensive margin. When there is an extensive margin, the highest price will be lower than the monopoly price. For instance, in markets with differentiated commodities or in markets in which individuals are imperfectly informed concerning the price distribution and have (as would be expected) different priors concerning it, when firms lower their prices, they not only will sell more to each customer but will find that there are more customers willing to purchase. In general, I have noted that the elasticity of demand with respect to price increases and with respect to price decreases will not be the same. With concave search technologies or linear search technologies with search without replacement, we obtain the result that in equilibrium there must be a price distribution. This is consistent with the kinds of results obtained earlier by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) . With convex search technologies, we obtain a kinked demand curve. It is important to note that the kinked demand curve arises in a competitive model, not from the oligopolistic interactions that are central to the traditional kinked demand curve.
V. Conclusions
It is surprising that, in spite of the long recognition of the importance of search costs, the full implications for the nature of market equilibrium have, until now, been so little investigated.
There were two primary motivations for undertaking the analysis of this paper. The first was to investigate whether the standard presumption that competition was more effective the larger the number of firms was valid within a search model. The results concerning the relationship between the number of firms and the equilibrium price turned out to be less clear-cut than I had hoped. The conventional result was established for the linear search cost technology. With a concave search cost technology, there was not an equilibrium price, only an equilibrium price distribution; however, with a convex search cost technology, as the number of firms increased, there was an increasingly large indeterminacy in the equilibrium price. While the minimum value of the range decreased, the maximum value in-creased: in the limit, the maximum price was in fact the monopoly price. '6 The second motivation for this study was to ascertain the conditions under which markets in which search was important would be characterized by firms facing kinked demand curves, which would give rise to the kinds of rigidities commonly associated with macroeconomic rigidities. I have shown that this is in fact the case, provided only that the search cost technology is convex. As a result, changes in, say, wages may nor result in any alteration, either in output or in price. Though the theory may have greater applicability for consumer goods markets than for other markets, note that, with differentiated commodities, the derived demand facing a manufacturer may itself have a kink reflecting the kink in the underlying demand curves facing its retailers.
The models formulated in this paper have been basically static. Individuals search for and purchase consumption for only one period. In many cases, once individuals decide to purchase at a store, they remain customers at that store for an extended period of time. To dislodge "loyal" customers from other stores by price cutting is difficult, suggesting that the elasticity of demand with respect to price By contrast, Satterthwaite (1979) obtained all unambiguous result. In addition to the differences between this model and that of' Satterthwaite noted in n. 13 above, one other important difference should be emphasized. In this model, firms explicitly take into account, the fact that, by lowering their prices, some low-search-cost individuals who otherwise would not have searched are induced to do so. Satterthwaite ignores this effect. Since this induced search effect, would seem to be strongest when there are few firms, I had originally thotight that the presumption that prices are positively related to the number of firms would be even stronger than in Satterthwaite's model. In general, the maximum price of the distribution is below the monopoly price; for if it is to raise the same revenues as other stores do, then the highest-price store must serve an interval of individuals, that is, all individuals with search costs greater than or equal to A. But then there is some group that is indifferent to searching or not, and hence the elasticity of demand of the highest-price store is greater than the elasticity of demand of the individual's demand curve. (The maximum price may be greater or smaller than the symmetric equilibrium price.)
